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Abstract
This article constitutes a new contribution to the analysis of overlapping instruments to cover the same
emission sources. Using both an analytical and a numerical model, we find that if there is a risk that the
carbon price drops to zero and if the political unavailability of a CO2 tax (at least in the European Union)
is taken into account, it can be socially beneficial to implement an additional instrument encouraging the
reduction of emissions, for instance a renewable energy subsidy. Our analysis has both a practical and a
theoretical purpose. It aims at giving economic insight to policymakers in a context of increased uncertainty
concerning the future stringency of the European Emission Trading Scheme. It also gives another rationale
for the use of several instruments to cover the same emission sources, and shows the importance of accounting
for corner solutions in the definition of the optimal policy mix.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Policy overlapping, Mitigation policy, Energy policy, EU-ETS, Renewable
energy, Corner solutions, Nil CO2 price, European Union.
1. Introduction
All countries and regions having implemented cli-
mate policies seem to rely on several policy instru-
ments, some of which covering the same emission
sources, rather than a single one1. In the European
Union, CO2 emissions from the electricity sector are
directly or indirectly covered by the EU Emission
Trading System (ETS) (Ellerman et al., 2010), by
energy-efficiency standards and energy-efficiency la-
bels on electric motors and appliances (UE, 2009),
by CO2 or energy taxes (in some Member States),
by energy-efficiency obligations2 (in some Member
States), and by renewable energy power (REP) sub-
sidies, in the form of feed-in tariffs, feed-in premi-
ums or REP portfolio obligations (in virtually all
Member States).
∗Corresponding author. CIRED, Campus du Jardin
Tropical, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736
Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex, France, Tel: +33143947376, Fax:
+33143947370, lecuyer[at]centre-cired.fr
1The unconvinced reader is invited to look at the Na-
tional Communications to the UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/
national reports/items/1408.php
2Lees (2012) provides a recent survey of these systems in
Europe, while Giraudet et al. (2012) discuss the costs and
benefits of these systems.
This multiplicity of policy instruments is in sharp
contrast to the so-called Tinbergen rule (Tinbergen,
1952) requiring in order to achieve a given number
of targets that policymakers control an equal num-
ber of instruments. Unsurprisingly, this multiplic-
ity has generated criticism by some economists who
argue that the policy instruments complementing
the EU ETS do not reduce CO2 emissions (which
are capped) but reduce the allowance price on the
ETS market and generate costly economic distor-
tions (Cf. for instance Bo¨hringer and Keller (2011);
Braathen (2007); Fischer and Preonas (2010) or Tol
(2010)). Indeed, some abatement options, such as
REP sources, are covered by several instruments
and benefit from a higher implicit carbon price
than others, such as coal-to-gas switch. The mix
of instruments promoting the same abatement op-
tions is therefore suboptimal, at least in a simple
economic model, as it disregards the equimarginal
principle and leads to sometime antagonist interac-
tions (Lecuyer and Bibas, 2011).
Yet, the multiplicity of policy instruments has
been justified by some other economists, on sev-
eral grounds. First, and most obviously, other pol-
icy targets such as air pollution reduction and se-
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curity of supply are differently impacted by the
various CO2 abatement options. Second, induced
technical change may be higher for some options
than for others. For instance, the deployment of
photovoltaic panels is likely to induce more techni-
cal change than coal-to-gas switch (see Fischer and
Newell (2008) for a review). Third, the slow diffu-
sion of clean technology justifies implementing more
costly but higher potential options, such as photo-
voltaic panels, before the cheaper but lower poten-
tial options, such as coal-to-gas switch (Vogt-Schilb
and Hallegatte, 2011). Fourth, some market fail-
ures, regulatory failures or behavioral failures may
reduce the economic efficiency of market-based in-
struments and justify additional policy instruments
(Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010). For instance, the
landlord-tenant dilemma reduces the efficiency of
CO2 pricing and can justify energy-efficiency stan-
dards in rented dwellings (de T’Serclaes and Jol-
lands, 2007), while regulatory failures may lead to
a too low carbon price, or prevent governments to
commit to a high enough future carbon price (Hoel,
2012).
Our aim is not to discuss these justifications, but
to introduce and discuss another rationale: the im-
pact of uncertainty on abatement costs combined
to the unavailability of the first-best instrument.
It is well known since Weitzman (1974) that un-
der uncertainty, the relative slope of the marginal
abatement cost curve and marginal damage of emis-
sions curve (labeled “marginal benefits” in Weitz-
man’s framework) is key to choose between a price
instrument (e.g. a CO2 tax) and a quantity in-
strument (e.g. a cap-and-trade system, like the
EU-ETS). More specifically, in the simplest form
of Weitzman’s (1974) model, the quantity instru-
ment should be chosen if the marginal damage curve
is steeper than the marginal abatement cost curve
while the price instrument should be chosen if the
marginal abatement cost curve is steeper. If the
marginal damage curve is completely flat then a
tax (set at the expected marginal damage) is the
first-best instrument. In the case of climate change
control, most researchers have concluded that on
this ground, a tax should be preferred to a cap-
and-trade system (e.g. Pizer (1999)). Indeed the
marginal damage curve of CO2 emissions over a few
years period is relatively flat because CO2 is a stock
pollutant (Newell and Pizer, 2003). Actually, this
argument is even stronger for policies covering only
a small part of total emissions, such as the EU ETS;
hence, with an uncertain marginal abatement cost
curve, an ETS is less efficient than a tax, i.e. it
brings a lower expected welfare.
Yet, in the EU, a meaningful CO2 tax is out of
reach because fiscal decisions are made under the
unanimity rule, while a cap-and-trade system has
been adopted thanks to the qualified majority rule
which applies to environmental matters (Convery,
2009). Another main reason why cap-and-trade was
chosen was for political economy reason in order to
be able to alleviate opposition of e.g. electricity
producers by means of free allocation of emission
permits3 (Boemare and Quirion, 2002).
The fact that the EU ETS is not optimal is il-
lustrated by its history since its introduction in
2005, which shows how volatile the carbon price
can be: it dropped to virtually zero in 2007 be-
cause allowance allocation in phase I was too gener-
ous (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008), recovered up to
more than e30/tCO2 because allocation in phase
II was tighter and dropped again sharply in 2009
following the economic crisis, down to e3/t CO2
in April 2013. While economists disagree over
the marginal damage of CO2 emissions, commonly
called the “social cost of carbon” (Perrissin Fabert
et al., 2012), they would presumably agree that
such a price evolution is inefficient: in some pe-
riods, the carbon price has prompted relatively ex-
pensive abatement options (up to e30/t CO2) while
in other periods, cheaper abatement options have
not been implemented. This potentially provides a
rationale for correcting the ETS and/or for comple-
menting it. Among the proposed corrections is the
introduction of a price cap and a price floor. Since
this proposal has been widely debated (e.g. Hour-
cade and Ghersi (2002)), we will not address it in
this paper.
Conversely, to our knowledge only two papers
have addressed the role of uncertainty on abatement
costs on the effectiveness of multiple instruments.
Mandell (2008) find that under some conditions, it
is more efficient to regulate a part of emissions by a
cap-and-trade program and the rest by an emission
tax, than to use a single instrument. Admittedly,
under such a mixed regulation, the marginal abate-
ment cost differs across emission sources, which
is inefficient, but the emission volume is generally
3 The ETS was also implemented as part of a long-term
strategy aiming at setting clear targets for investors. As a
market instrument, it also brings value as a coordination tool
for investment efforts across a large range of sectors or parts
of sectors.
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closer to the ex post optimum than under a single
instrument: following an increase in the marginal
abatement cost, the tax yields too high an emission
level while the cap-and-trade system yields a level
which is too low, so these inefficiencies partly cancel
out.
The other paper is by Hoel (2012, section 9) who
studies the opportunity to subsidize REP in case
of an uncertain future carbon tax. He studies the
case of scientific uncertainty (damages caused by
climate change are uncertain) and political uncer-
tainty (the current government knows that there
might be a different government in the future, and
that this government may have a different valuation
of emissions). He shows that scientific uncertainty
justifies a subsidy to REP if REP producers are
risk-averse. Under political uncertainty, results are
more complex. If the current government expects
the future government to have a lower valuation of
emission reductions than itself, this tends to make
the optimal subsidy positive. Hoel (2012) studies
the impact of uncertainty, but only when the sub-
sidy is combined to a tax, not when it is combined
to an ETS — which is what the present article fo-
cuses on.
While we also address the role of uncertainty con-
cerning abatement costs on the effectiveness of mul-
tiple instruments, our focus is on whether it makes
sense to use several instruments to cover the same
emission sources and not to cover different sources,
as in Mandell’s article (Mandell, 2008). More pre-
cisely, we assume that the EU cannot implement a
CO2 tax because of the above-mentioned unanim-
ity rule but can implement an ETS. However some
CO2 abatement options (for illustration, REP) can
be incentivised by a price instrument (in this case,
a subsidy to REP, e.g. a feed-in tariff). In our
model, without uncertainty on the energy demand
level (and hence on abatement costs) or if uncer-
tainty is low enough, using the REP subsidy in ad-
dition to the ETS is not cost-efficient because there
is no reason to give a higher subsidy to REP than to
other abatement options. However we find that this
uncertainty provides a rationale for using the REP
subsidy in addition to the ETS, if it is large enough
to entail a risk of a nil carbon price4. Even though
the first-best policy would be a CO2 tax, when the
latter is unavailable, using both a REP subsidy and
4Since we use an expected welfare maximization model
with a subjective probability distribution, we do not distin-
guish between risk and uncertainty.
an ETS may provide a higher expected welfare than
using an ETS alone.
We demonstrate this result using three ap-
proaches. Section 2 presents the intuition in a
graphical way. Section 3 develops an analytical
model and presents some key analytical results
based on the same intuition. Section 4 further com-
pletes the model and presents a numerical applica-
tion on the European electricity sector. Section 5
concludes.
2. The possibility of a nil carbon price: jus-
tification and implications for instrument
choice
This section presents our main conclusion in an
intuitive and graphical way. We study the possi-
bility of a nil carbon price, unaccounted in Weitz-
man’s seminal Prices vs. Quantities paper (Weitz-
man, 1974) or in the related literature, on optimal
policy instrument choice. We show that using a
REP subsidy in addition to the ETS improves ex-
pected welfare in so far as uncertainty on the de-
mand level is large enough to entail a possibility of
a nil carbon price, i.e. if there is a possibility that
demand for GHG quotas turns out to be so low,
compared to its expected value, that the ETS cap
becomes non-binding.
Before introducing the intuition, let us give some
elements justifying the possibility of a nil carbon
price, in the light of the experience with cap-and-
trade systems. An allowance price dropping to
zero in an ETS is not unrealistic at all, and hap-
pened in some of the most well-known ETS world-
wide. In the EU ETS, the carbon price dropped to
zero at the end of the first period (in 2007). It
would have done so in the second period (2008-
2012) again without the possibility to bank al-
lowances for the next period (2013-2020) and the
likelihood of a political intervention to sustain the
price. In the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), which covers power plant CO2 emissions
from North-Eastern US states, phase one carbon
emissions fell 33% below cap (Point carbon, 2012).
Consequently, the price remained at the auction re-
serve price, below $2/tCO2. The cap also turned
out to be higher than emissions in the tradable
permit program to control air pollution in Santi-
ago, Chile (Coria and Sterner, 2010) and in the
UK greenhouse gas ETS (Smith and Swierzbinski,
2007). Even in the US SO2 ETS, the price is now
below $1/tSO2 (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2012),
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(a) Instrument choice with low uncer-
tainty: the policymaker sets the cap at
the intersection of the expected marginal
costs and the marginal damage of emis-
sions, minimizing the expected extra cost
compared to the ex-post optimum (area
with vertical lines in the MAC- state and
area with squares in the MAC+ state).
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(b) Instrument choice with high uncer-
tainty: here setting a cap at the inter-
section of the expected marginal costs
and the marginal damage of emissions
does not minimize the total costs. The
carbon price is nil in the MAC- state.
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(c) Instrument choice with high uncer-
tainty: setting the cap at the intersec-
tion of the MAC+ marginal costs and
the marginal damage of emissions mini-
mizes the costs in the MAC+ state with
no additional costs in the MAC- state.
Figure 1: The implications of the possibility of a nil carbon price on optimal policy instrument choice.
vs. more than $150/tSO2 ten years before, because
new regulations and the decrease in high-sulfur fu-
els consumption have reduced emissions below the
cap.
Figure 1 present grpahically the implications of
the possibility of a nil carbon price on optimal pol-
icy instrument choice. For our purpose, it is more
convenient to draw the marginal cost and marginal
damage as a function of emissions rather than as
a function of abatement (as in Weitzman’s paper),
because we are interested in the uncertainty of un-
abated emissions. Let’s assume that the Marginal
Damage MD is known with certainty and is per-
fectly flat. We do not model the uncertainty on the
marginal damage side since it is well known that
this uncertainty matters only when correlated with
abatement cost (Weitzman, 1974; Stavins, 1996).
In our model, as in these two papers, adding (un-
correlated) uncertainty on marginal damages from
emissions would not influence the ranking of in-
struments. Let’s further assume than the marginal
abatement cost curve is uncertain and can take with
an equal probability two values, MAC+ and MAC-
5, representing for instance the two extreme cases of
a probability distribution. This uncertainty on the
MACs captures economic uncertainty, as well as un-
certainty on the technological costs (Quirion, 2005).
In Figure 1a, uncertainty is lower (MAC- (decreas-
ing dashed line) and MAC+(decreasing solid line)
are closer) than in Figure 1b and 1c.
5Noted MC in Weitzman (1974).
Since the marginal damage of emissions MD is
known with certainty and perfectly flat, a price in-
strument (like a CO2 tax) is optimal, both ex-ante
and ex-post. On the opposite, a quantity instru-
ment (like an emission cap or the EU-ETS) is gen-
erally not optimal ex-post because the cap does not
follow the (ex-post) optimal emission level. Let’s
analyze how a risk-neutral policy maker minimiz-
ing expected cost (or maximizing expected welfare)
would set the cap.
In Figure 1a, with a low uncertainty, the pol-
icy maker would set the optimal cap at the inter-
section between the marginal damage of emissions
and the expected marginal abatement cost curve
(the dotted-dashed line). This is also the expected
emission level under a price instrument. The ex-
pected carbon price would then equal the marginal
damage of emissions6 , although ex post, the car-
bon price would be either higher (p+CO2) or lower
(p−CO2) than the expected carbon price (E[pCO2 ]).
The cost of the quantity instrument compared to
6 This equality (in expectation) between the price instru-
ment and the quantity instrument regarding price and quan-
tity is dubbed “certainty equivalence” by Hoel and Karp
(2001). They find that while the equivalence prevails with
additive uncertainty (a shift of the marginal abatement cost
curve as in Weitzman’s original paper), it does not un-
der multiplicative uncertainty (a change in the slope of the
marginal abatement cost curve). In this paper, we find that
even with additive uncertainty on abatement costs, this prin-
ciple does not prevail if there is a possibility that the price
drops to zero.
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the price instrument (or to the optimum) is given
by the area with squares (in case of a higher than
expected cost) or by the area with vertical lines (in
case of a lower than expected cost). All this is con-
sistent with Weitzman’s standard model.
Conversely, in Figure 1b which features a large
uncertainty, setting the optimal cap at the inter-
section between the marginal damage and the ex-
pected marginal abatement cost curve (vertical dot-
ted line) does not minimize the expected cost: such
a cap would not be binding in the MAC- state, but
it would entail a significant cost, both in the MAC-
state (the area with vertical lines) and in the MAC+
state (the area with squares).
A better solution (Figure 1c) is to set a more le-
nient cap which equalizes the marginal abatement
cost and marginal damages of emissions only in the
MAC+ state: the extra cost compared to the price
instrument would then be nil in the MAC+ state
while it would still equal the area with vertical lines
in the MAC- state. In other words, the policy-
maker now neglects the MAC- state, knowing that
in such an eventuality, the cap is non-binding any-
way; rather he sets the cap which is optimal is the
high-cost state.
Notice in Figure 1c that in the MAC+ state,
the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal
damage; hence the welfare loss from a marginal
additional effort would only be of the second or-
der. Conversely, in the low-cost state, the marginal
abatement cost is below the marginal damage;
hence the welfare gain from a marginal additional
effort would be of the first order. Consequently, an
additional policy instrument might improve welfare
even if it entails additional abatement in both states
of nature, and even if it is imperfect — for exam-
ple, because it targets only a subset of abatement
options, like a REP subsidy.
Having explained the intuition of our main re-
sults, we now turn to the presentation of the ana-
lytical model.
3. Key analytical results in a stylized elec-
tricity market
To discuss the implications of a possible nil car-
bon price on the electricity sector, we model in this
section a stylized European electricity market with
an uncertain demand. This uncertainty on the elec-
tricity demand results in an uncertain abatement
effort for any given emission cap, and hence in an
uncertain MAC, as in the previous section.
We first present the equations and the programs
of the producers and the social planner. The set-
ting presented here corresponds to a mix with an
ETS and a REP subsidy. Appendix C and follow-
ing present the other settings used in our analytical
results.
3.1. Analytical framework and equations
We represent three types of agents: a social plan-
ner, representative electricity producers and repre-
sentative consumers. The social planner maximizes
an expected welfare function by choosing the opti-
mal level of various instruments depending on the
available instrument set: a carbon tax, an emission
cap for the electricity sector or a REP subsidy. For
demonstration purposes we focus in the model pre-
sentation on a setting with an emission cap and a
renewable subsidy.
The emission cap can be interpreted as a stylized
representation of the EU-ETS. The future level of
electricity demand is uncertain, with a risk that the
carbon price drops to zero in case of low demand.
The electricity market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive and we assume a 100% pass-through of
the emission allowance.
The model is a two-stage framework. In the first
stage, the social planner chooses the level of the
various policy instruments, facing an uncertainty
about the level of future electricity demand. In
the second stage, the electricity producers maxi-
mize their profit given the policy instrument levels
and the demand function.
3.1.1. Step 1: the producer profit maximization
problem
We consider two types of electricity generation:
fossil fuels (f) and REP (r). The electricity pro-
ducers can also make abatement investments (a) to
comply with the emission cap. Those abatements
are assumed for simplicity to be independent from
the level of fossil-based production. They refer for
instance to investments making coal-fueled power
plants able to cope with some share of biomass,
CCS investments or allowance purchases on the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market. p
is the electricity wholesale price.
Producers face an aggregate emission cap Ω and
benefit from a REP subsidy ρ. φ is the carbon price
emerging from the allowance market, equal to the
shadow value of the emission cap constraint. We
assume a 100% pass-through from allowance costs
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to wholesale price. In our framework, ρ can be seen
as a feed-in premium for instance. The producer
maximizes its profit Π (Table 1 describes all the
variables and parameters).
max
f,r,a
Π(p, f, r, a, φ, ρ) = p · f + (p+ ρ) · r (1)
− Cf (f)− Cr(r)
−AC(a)− PC(f, a, φ)
where Cf (f) and Cr(r) are the production costs
from fossil fuel and REP respectively. We assume
decreasing returns for REP and constant returns
for emitting power plants (C ′f (f) > 0, C
′
r(r) >
0, C ′′f (f) = 0 and C
′′
r (r) > 0). The decreasing re-
turns assumption is justified as the best production
sites are used first and further REP development
implies investing in less and less productive sites.
On the contrary, emitting technologies such as com-
bined cycles power plants or advanced coal power
plants are easily scalable and thus do not generate a
scarcity rent (Jonghe et al., 2009; Fischer, 2010; Fis-
cher and Preonas, 2010). AC(a) is the Abatement
Cost function of the electricity producers, indepen-
dent of fossil or REP production and PC(f, a, φ) is
the allowance Purchasing Cost. The cost functions
have a classical linear-quadratic form:
Cf (f) = ιf · f
Cr(r) = ιr · r + r
2
2σr
AC(a) =
σa
2
a2
PC(f, a, φ) = φ · (τ · f − a)
With ιf and ιr the intercepts (iota like intercept) of
the fossil fuel and the REP marginal supply func-
tion respectively and σr the slope (sigma like slope)
of the REP marginal supply function7. σa is the
slope of the marginal abatement cost curve for the
electricity producer and τ is the average unabated
carbon intensity of fossil fuel-based electricity pro-
duction. We define a linear downward sloping elec-
tricity demand function d(·) (with d′(·) < 0) whose
7The supply functions are the expression of the quan-
tity produced as a function of price. This corresponds to
the inverse of the marginal cost function, and the slope of
the supply function (σr) is the inverse of the slope of the
marginal cost function ( 1
σr
). We constructed the Renew-
able cost function this way in order to keep the dimension
of σr consistent with the slope of the demand function σd,
allowing for some simplifications in the equations.
intercept depends on the state of the world. We
consider two different states s occuring with a prob-
ability Ps, one with a high demand (d+(p)) and one
with a low demand (d−(p)). The demand function
is defined as:
d(p) = ιd ±∆− σd · p
with the intercept being ιd+ ∆ in the high-demand
state of the world and ιd − ∆ in the low-demand
state. The equilibrium conditions on the electricity
and the emission markets thus depend on the state
of the world.
f + r = d(p) (2)
is the demand constraint. In each state of the world,
the electricity supply has to meet the demand on
the electricity market.{
τ · f− − a− < Ω
φ− = 0
or
{
τ · f+ − a+ = Ω
φ+ > 0
(3)
expresses the joint constraint on emissions and car-
bon price. In the high-demand state of the world,
total emissions cannot be higher than the cap Ω and
the carbon price is therefore strictly positive. In the
low-demand state, we assume that the emission cap
constraint is non-binding, hence the carbon price is
nil.
The first order conditions of the producer maxi-
mization problem are the following:
p = ιf + τφ (4)
Fossil fuel producers will equalize marginal produc-
tion costs with the wholesale market price, net from
the price of emissions.
ρ+ p = ιr +
r
σr
(5)
REP producers will equalize marginal production
costs with the wholesale market price, net from the
subsidy.
σaa = φ (6)
Fossil fuel producers will equalize the marginal
abatement cost with the carbon price.
The values of the market variables (p, f, r, a, φ)
as a function of policy instruments are found by
solving the system of equations (2) to (6). They
represent the reaction functions of the electricity
producer.
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Dimension Description
f (MWh) Electricity from fossil fuels
r (MWh) Electricity from REP sources
p (e/MWh) Wholesale power price
a (tCO2) Abatements from power sector
φ (e/tCO2) Carbon price
ρ (e/MWh) REP subsidy
Ω (tCO2) Emission cap
σa (e/ tCO22) Slope of power sector MACC
σd (MWh
2/e) Slope of demand function
σr (MWh
2/e) Slope of RE supply function
δ (e/ tCO2) Marginal environmental damage
λ - Probability of the high-demand state
∆ (MWh) Variance of demand
τ (tCO2/MWh)Average carbon intensity (fossil fuels)
ιf (e/ MWh) Intercept of fossil fuel supply function
ιr (e/ MWh) Intercept of RE supply function
ιd (e/ MWh) Intercept of demand function
Table 1: Variables and parameters used in the mod-
els.
3.1.2. Step 2: the social planner’s expected welfare
maximization problem
The social planner, assumed risk-neutral and giv-
ing the same weight to consumers and producers,
faces an uncertain future demand and has a lim-
ited number of possible policy instruments (i.e. an
emission cap and a REP subsidy) to maximize the
expected welfare. We assume no social external-
ity on the public funding, as this would imply that
all public goods become more expensive, including
the environment. We would have to add a dead-
weight loss on the revenues from the emission cap
allowances transfers, and distinguish several cases
with and without auction. We keep therefore our
welfare function as simple as possible:
max
Ω,ρ
EW (Ω, ρ) =
∑
s∈states
Ps(CS(p) (7)
+ Π(p, f, r, a, φ)− dam(f, a)
− ρ · r + PC(f, a, φ))
Ps is the probability of the two states of the world:
P+ = λ and P− = (1− λ), λ ∈ [0, 1]. CS(p) is the
consumer surplus and dam(f, a) is the environmen-
tal damage function from the GHG emissions. The
last two terms of the expected welfare cancel pure
transfers between agents included in the profit func-
tions. The consumer surplus CS and the damage
function are taken as simple as possible for clarity.
In particular, consumer are assumed risk-neutral:
CS(p) =
∫ d(p)
0
d−1(q)dq − p · d(p)
dam(f, a) =δ · (τf − a)
With δ the constant environmental damage coeffi-
cient (Newell and Pizer, 2003). After having sub-
stituted the market variables in the expected wel-
fare function (7) with the reaction functions coming
from the producer problem we maximize the ex-
pected welfare. The first-order conditions give the
optimal levels of the policy instruments across all
states (ρ? and Ω?).
3.2. Social optimum when the carbon price is nil in
the low-demand state
Proposition 1. When the carbon price is nil in the
low-demand state of the world, the optimal renew-
able subsidy is strictly positive.
Proof. The optimal levels of the policy instruments
across all states are given by solving the first-order
conditions of the welfare maximization problem (7)
(see Appendix E).
Ω? =τ∆ + τιd + τιrσr (8)
− τ(σd + σr)(ιf + δτ)− δ
σa
ρ? =(1− λ)δτ 1 + σaσdτ
2
1 + σa(σd + σr − λσr)τ2 (9)
knowing that all parameters are positive, and us-
ing the reaction functions from the profit maximiza-
tion problem (1), we can write:
0 <ρ? < δ τ (10)
Results follow directly.
If we considered only one certain state, we would
fall back on the first-best optimum characterized
by a REP subsidy equal to zero and the emission
cap set so as to equalize the carbon price with the
marginal damage δ. The cap is set to be optimal
in the high-demand state only, and does not de-
pend on the probability distribution. We see here
in (10) that the optimal subsidy is a portion of the
marginal environmental damage (see also (12) be-
low), and is weighted by the probability of the low-
demand-state (1− λ).
By substituting the optimal levels of policy in-
struments in the reaction functions, we obtain the
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socially optimal level of all market variables for
both states of demand (see Appendix E).
While in a first-best world the carbon price would
equal the marginal environmental damage, in this
second-best setting, the optimal carbon price in the
high-demand state is lower because the REP sub-
sidy also reduces emissions. The expected carbon
price Eφ =
∑
s∈states Ps ·φs can be rearranged into:∑
s∈states
Ps · φs = δ · λ(1 + σaσd(τ)
2)
1 + σa(σd + σr − λσr)τ2
(11)
The term in the denominator expresses the substi-
tutions taking place when the abatement through
carbon pricing only is no longer optimal.
Proposition 2. When the carbon price is nil in the
low-demand state of the world, the renewable sub-
sidy equivalent in e/tCO2 is equal to the marginal
damage of emissions minus the expected carbon
price.
Proof. Combining (9) and (11) gives:
ρ?
τ
= δ − Eφ (12)
The proof follows directly.
In (12), ρ
?
τ is the marginal abatement effort
through REP promotion and Eφ is the expected
marginal abatement effort through carbon pricing.
The simple intuition behind this result is that since
the expected carbon price is below the marginal
damages, the additional instrument, e.g. the REP
subsidy, is also used to reduce emissions.
Since the carbon price is nil in the low-demand
state, the expected carbon price decreases with the
probability of the high-demand state (everything
else being equal). Equation (12) reveals that the op-
timal subsidy moves accordingly to keep the global
expected mitigation effort constant and equal to the
marginal damage.
3.3. Expected emissions with various instrument
mixes
As mentioned in section 2, in Weitzman’s model
(Weitzman, 1974) with an additive uncertainty on
the marginal abatement cost curve, the expected
emissions are the same with a price or a quantity
instrument. This is no longer the case in our model.
Par.
Meaning of an increase in the
parameter
Sign of
partial der.
σa Higher abatement cost +
σd More elastic power demand –
σr Cheaper REP –
δ Higher marginal damage –
∆ Higher demand variance +
λ
Higher probability of the high-
demand state
–
Table 2: Signs of partial derivatives of the difference
between the cap minus the emissions in the low-
demand state for a nil carbon price; – indicates a
negative partial derivative, + indicates a positive
partial derivative and ? indicates an ambiguous
sign.
Proposition 3. If there is a risk that the carbon
price equals zero in the low-demand state of the
world, expected emissions vary with the instrument
mix.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The expected emissions are lower in the second-
best setting (with an ETS and a REP subsidy) than
in the third (with an ETS alone) and even lower
with a first-best carbon tax.
The expected carbon price changes also. It is low-
est in the second-best setting when it is optimal to
implement a REP subsidy along with the emission
cap.
The drop between first-best and second-best is
mostly due to the nil carbon price in the low-
demand state of the world. When comparing third-
best and second-best, the carbon price is lower be-
cause another instrument, the REP subsidy, is now
also used to reduce emissions.
3.4. Boundary condition for having a nil carbon
price in the low-demand state of the world
As discussed in the graphical anlaysis in Sec-
tion 2, the carbon price drops to zero when the op-
timal cap no longer crosses the low-demand MAC
curve. In this section we investigate the effect of a
change in the main parameters on the boundary be-
tween the positive-carbon price and the nil-carbon
price spaces.
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Par.
Meaning of an increase
in the parameter
ρ: REP
subsidy
Ω: Emission
cap
σa Higher abatement cost ]0;1[ +
σd
More elastic power de-
mand
]-1;0[ –
σr Cheaper REP ]0;1[ ?
δ
Higher marginal dam-
age
1 –
Table 4: Elasticity of instrument variables with re-
spect to various parameters. ]-1;0[ indicates an elas-
ticity between 0 and -1; ]0;1[ indicates an elasticity
between 0 and 1; + or – indicate respectively a
positive or negative elasticity; ? indicates an inde-
terminate sign of the elasticity.
Proposition 4. On the boundary, the carbon price
in the low-demand state drops to zero as mitiga-
tion options (abatements and REP) become more
expensive, uncertainty on the level of the electric-
ity demand grows, the demand gets more inelastic,
the environmental damage gets lower and the low-
demand state gets more probable.
Proof. We compute the equilibrium conditions of
the model without making any assumption on the
emission or the carbon price levels in the low-
demand state (see Appendix B). The expression
for emissions, being a decreasing function of the
carbon price, give the expression of the MAC curve
in the low-demand state.
The difference between the emission cap and the
low-demand state MAC curve for φ− = 0 give then
a test of the positivity of the carbon price in the
low-demand state. When emissions at φ− = 0 are
below the cap, the carbon price is nil, and when
emissions are above the cap, the carbon price is
positive.
Table 2 gives the sign of the partial derivative of
the difference between the cap minus the emissions
in the low-demand state for a nil carbon price. On
the boundary, if this difference increases, the carbon
price drops to zero; if it decrases, the carbon price
rises above zero.
3.5. Variables’ elasticity with respect to parameters
As a preliminary step to the numerical sensitivity
analysis presented in Section 4, Table 3 and Table 4
show the sign of the elasticity of all variables with
respect to various parameters in the 2nd Best set-
ting (instrument mix M2, see Appendix C), and
indicate whether they are above or below 1.
Proposition 5. the optimal subsidy ρ? rises as
abatement is more expensive, production from REP
sources is cheaper, electricity demand is less elastic
to electricity price and the marginal environmental
damage from GHG emissions rises.
Proof. Table 4 shows the sign of variation of the
optimal levels of policy instruments when various
parameters change8. A positive elasticity indicates
a positive variation when a parameter increases,
and an absolute elasticity smaller than one indicates
that a 1% change in that parameter will cause a less
than 1% change in the variable. We see that the
elasticity of ρ with respect to σa and σr is positive
but smaller than 1, with respect to σd it is negative
but smaller than one and the elasticity with respect
to δ is 1. The proof follows directly.
The explanation of this result is straightforward:
more REP should be installed when the environ-
mental damage is higher, when REP are cheaper
and when the other ways to reduce emissions, i.e.
abatement and energy savings become more expen-
sive. Similarly, a higher abatement cost naturally
leads to a less stringent emission cap Ω, while a
higher marginal damage and a more elastic elec-
tricity demand (which means higher energy savings
for a given change in electricity price) lead to a
more stringent cap. The impact of cheaper REP
on the optimal cap is ambiguous: on the one hand,
it reduces the overall cost of cutting emissions, lead-
ing to a more stringent cap, but on the other hand
it pushes to an increased use of the other policy
instrument, the subsidy, which minors the impor-
tance of the emission cap.
Table 3 shows that in state –, there is no abate-
ment, the carbon price is nil and the electricity price
is solely determined by the supply curve, so the pa-
rameters considered in Table 3 have no effect on
these variables. However, they have an indirect ef-
fect on f− and r− since they impact ρ. Hence, the
considered parameters increase the amount of REP
r− and they decrease the amount of fossil-fuel elec-
tricity f− when they increase the REP subsidy ρ.
8Elasticities have been calculated in Mathematica. The
Mathematica notebook is available upon request from the
contact author
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Param.
Meaning of an increase in
the parameter
Level of
demand
(state)
f r p a φ
fossil fuel REP
electricity
price
abatements CO2 price
σa Higher abatement cost
High (+) + − ]− 1; 0[ < −1 ]− 1; 0[
Low(–) − + 0 0 0
σd More elastic power demand
High (+) ? + ]0; 1[ ]0; 1[ ]0; 1[
Low(–) ? − 0 0 0
σr Cheaper REP
High (+) ? ? ]− 1; 0[ ]− 1; 0[ ]− 1; 0[
Low(–) ? ? 0 0 0
δ Higher marginal damage
High (+) − + ]0; 1[ 1 1
Low(–) − + 0 0 0
Table 3: Market variables’ elasticity with respect to various parameters. ]-1;0[ indicates an elasticity between
0 and -1; ]0;1[ indicates an elasticity between 0 and 1; + or – indicate respectively a positive or negative
elasticity; ? indicates an ambiguous sign of the elasticity.
In state +, as one could have expected, more
abatements and a higher CO2 price φ+ are trig-
gered by a lower abatement cost, a more elastic elec-
tricity demand, more expensive REP, and a higher
marginal damage. Moreover, a higher electricity
price is triggered by a higher marginal damage,
costlier REP, a more elastic electricity demand and,
more surprisingly, a lower abatement cost. The ex-
planation is that a lower abatement cost implies a
more stringent target (Table 4), which in turn raises
the electricity price in state +.
In state +, changes in energy production follow
changes in the CO2 price φ+: lower abatement
costs, higher marginal damages and a more elastic
electricity demand increase the CO2 price, which in
turn decrease the relative competitiveness of fossil
fuel. In state –, the CO2 price is nil and changes are
more sensitive to the REP subsidy: higher abate-
ment costs, higher marginal damages and a more
elastic electricity demand increase the optimal REP
subsidy, which in turn increase the relative compet-
itiveness of REP.
Comparing Table 4 and Table 3 finally shows that
the carbon price and the REP subsidy vary in oppo-
site directions (except when the marginal damage
changes). This can be seen in (12). If there is a risk
that the carbon price equals zero in the low-demand
state of the world, the mitigation efforts induced by
the carbon price are no longer sufficient. An addi-
tional effort through REP production is necessary,
induced by a strictly positive REP subsidy.
4. Numerical application : the European
electricity sector and allowance market
4.1. Modified model
Having shown some analytical results with a
model of a electricity sector alone, we turn to a
slightly more complex model to show numerical re-
sults calibrated on the European electricity and al-
lowance markets. In this section, we add an explicit
allowance supply from non-electricity ETS sectors.
We therefore add a composite sector including all
the other constrained emitters. The electricity pro-
ducer can buy emission allowances (e) from the
other constrained sectors on the allowance market
to comply to the emission constraint. The other
ETS sectors are represented by their total abate-
ment cost function, which has the following form:
ACe =
σe
2
e2 −
{
ιe e in state +
0 in state –
where σe is the slope of the aggregate non-electricity
ETS sector marginal abatement cost curve. The
intercepts differ in the low demand and the high-
demand state of the world. We assume there is a
positive correlation between the level of electricity
demand and the level of industrial activity. When
the electricity demand is low, the industrial activity
is also low and the allowance surplus is higher.
Next subsections will detail the data and assump-
tions made to calibrate the model. Some parame-
ters being subject to a large uncertainty, we use a
range of possible values for those parameters and
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Description Dimension Range
Marginal environmental
damage
(e/tCO2) (10.,20.,...,30)
Price-elasticity of demand
(absolute value)
1 (0.1,0.2,...,0.5)
Abatement from the ag-
gregate ETS sector for 15
e/tCO2
(%) (1,2,...,5)
Abatement from the power
sector for 15 e/tCO2
(%) (1,2,...,5)
Maximum share of REP in
the energy mix
(%) (10,20,...,50)
Standard deviation of de-
mand
(TWh) (33,49...,98)
Table 6: Ranges of parameters used in the numer-
ical simulations for calibration purposes. All pos-
sible combinations of parameters were successively
simulated.
discuss the distribution of results. For each uncer-
tain parameter, we use a uniform probability dis-
tribution and we assume that these parameters are
not correlated (except for the electricity demand
and the industrial activity levels). Table 5 shows
the minimum, median and maximum values of cal-
ibrated parameters resulting from the calibration
process and used in the simulations.
We performed simulations with all possible com-
binations of parameters shown in Table 5, without
any constraint on the carbon price. We tested the
positivity of the carbon price, and if negative in
the low-demand state, we conducted other simula-
tions by constraining the carbon price to be equal
to zero in the low-demand state. This distinguishes
two qualitatively different simulation results. In the
first category (subsequently called 2nd Best B), the
carbon price is strictly positive in the low-demand
state and the renewable subsidy is nil. In the sec-
ond category (subsequently called 2nd Best A), the
carbon price is nil in the low-demand state and the
renewable subsidy is strictly positive. Appendix I
details the equations and solution of this model.
4.2. Data and assumptions for calibration
4.2.1. Supply functions
The supply curves are tuned so as to match es-
timated long term marginal production costs func-
tions. According to OECD (2010), the REP pro-
duction break-even point starts at e80/MWh and
goes up to e160/MWh. This marginal cost is rather
a lower bound, as network and intermittency costs
tend to raise it. We calibrated the REP supply
function slope so as to reach the upper limit of the
REP long-term marginal cost at a given percentage
of a reference production level. This reference pro-
duction level is taken equal to the electricity pro-
duction from REP and fossil fuels in 2008, that is
2,060 TWh (ENERDATA, 2011). For the maximal
penetration rate of REP, we took a range of pos-
sible percentages, ranging from 10% to 50%. The
fossil fuel long term supply curve, set at e80/MWh
is tuned to an average European CCGT levelized
cost of electricity, following OECD (2010).
4.2.2. Demand function
The demand function has been calibrated so as
to have a given price-elasticity when the demand
equals the average between the 2008 and the 2009
reference production levels (2,060 TWh in 2008
and 1,929 TWh in 2009 (ENERDATA, 2011)). We
chose elasticities ranging from -0.1 to -0.5. The de-
mand standard deviation ∆ between the two states
of the world was assumed to be close to the mean
absolute deviation from the reference demand in
2008 and 2009. We chose values ranging from +50%
to -50% of this value to account for the uncertainty
on a possible future shock on demand. We assume
each state of demand has a probability of 12 to oc-
cur.
4.2.3. Abatement costs
The slope of the marginal abatement cost curve
in the electricity sector has been calculated as fol-
lows: given an average CO2 price of e22/tCO2 in
2008, we assumed that fuel-switch allowed to abate
a range of percentages of the total emissions of the
electricity sector in 2008, ranging from 1 % to 5 %.
This is in range with Ellerman and Buchner (2008),
reporting an abatement of around 5% at a CO2
price equal to e15/tCO2. The marginal abatement
cost curve of the ETS sector other than electricity
was calibrated in the same way, by assuming a cer-
tain percentage of abatement in 2008 given the CO2
price. We assumed abatements ranging from 1% to
5% for both sectors. The intercept of the marginal
abatement cost curve for non-electricity sectors in
the low-demand state was calculated so as to ob-
tain the difference of allowance over-allocation be-
tween 2008 and 2009 when the CO2 price drops to
zero (102 MtCO2 of allowance surplus in 2008, 241
MtCO2 surplus in 2009; data from Sandbag (2012).
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Units Description Min Median Max
σa (e/MtCO2
2) Slope of the power sector MACC 0.44 0.81 2.2
σe (e/MtCO22) Slope of the rest-of-ETS MACC 0.52 0.95 2.61
σr (GWh
2/e) Slope of the demand function 2.58 6.7 12.9
σd (GWh
2/e) Slope of the RE supply function 2.49 6.43 12.5
δ (e/tCO2) Marginal environmental damage 10 15.3 30
∆ (TWh) Variance of demand 32.8 69.6 98.3
τ (tCO2/MWh) Average carbon intensity of fossil fuel-based electricity 0.5 0.5 0.5
λ - Probability of the high-demand state 0.5 0.5 0.5
ιf (e/MWh) Intercept of the fossil fuel supply function 80 80 80
ιr (e/MWh) Intercept of the RE supply function 80 80 80
ιd (Ge/MWh) Intercept of the demand function 2.19 2.51 2.99
ιe (e/tCO2)
Intercept of the rest-of-ETS MACC (state +) 94.6 173 473
Intercept of the rest-of-ETS MACC (state –) 0 0 0
Table 5: Values of the calibrated parameters.
We took into account the perimeter of the ETS
combustion sector — which includes electricity and
heat production — by adding the additional surplus
allowances coming from the heat plants (41 MtCO2
according to Trotignon and Delbosc (2008)).
4.2.4. Additional parameters
We took an average carbon intensity of 0.5
tCO2/MWh for fossil production (IEA Statistics,
2011), and a marginal damage between e10 and
e30/tCO2. The calibration presented in previous
paragraphs is very cautious, considering demand
and production levels already observed in 2008 and
2009. The increased regulatory risk induced by the
introduction of the third ETS phase and possible
changes in the future Energy Efficiency Directive
are captured through changing the standard devia-
tion of demand and emission surplus from the non
electricity ETS sector.
Table 6 synthesizes the range of values used for
all parameters subject to a large uncertainty.
4.3. Optimal policy instruments and CO2 price lev-
els
With the parameter ranges shown in Table 5,
50.9% of the simulations display a nil carbon price
in the low-demand state and a strictly positive REP
subsidy. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. It shows
box whisker plots of the optimal emission cap Ω?
(Fig. 2a) and the optimal REP subsidy ρ? (Fig.
2b) in all simulations with a 2nd Best instrument
setting (mix Mn2 ) and a nil carbon price in the low-
demand state. Figure 2c shows a box whisker plot
of the expected CO2 price.
The optimal emission cap ranges from 0.91 to
1.02 GtCO2, and the optimal subsidy ranges from
e2.68/MWh to e9.93/MWh. The optimal ex-
pected CO2 price ranges from e2.97/tCO2 to
e13.6/tCO2. As a comparison, the actual cap cal-
culated by Trotignon and Delbosc (2008)) amounts
to 1.05 GtCO2, the actual REP tariff range from
e50/MWh to e90/MWh in France and Germany
and since summer 2011, the CO2 price has been
in the range (e3/tCO2-e13/tCO2). The relatively
low levels of both the expected CO2 price and the
REP subsidy are due to the fact that it is a linear
combination of both that equals the marginal dam-
age (see (12)). These values cannot necessarily be
directly compared to actual subsidy levels since the
latter account for all positive externalities expected
from REP support.
4.4. Expected welfare gains from adding a REP sub-
sidy
In order to evaluate the gains from adding a sub-
sidy to the ETS, we compute the expected welfare
differences between simulations with different in-
strument mixes. We compare four settings:
• A first-best instrument mix (M1), with a
unique CO2 price across all states of the world;
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Figure 2: Box whisker plots of the optimal instrument values and expected CO2 price for all simulations
with a 2nd Best instrument setting (mix Mn2 ) and a nil carbon price in the low-demand state of the world.
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Figure 3: Box whisker plots of expected welfare gains from adding a given instrument mix to a BAU setting
with no instrument (M0 →Mn3 , M0 →Mn2 , M0 →M1) in bn e, and of expected welfare gains from adding
a REP subsidy to an ETS (Mn3 →Mn2 ) in million e and in percentage of the expected gains from a carbon
tax, in all scenarios where the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state of the world.
• A second-best instrument mix (M2), with
an ETS and a REP subsidy;
• A third-best instrument mix (M3), with
an ETS alone and a nil CO2 price in the low-
demand state.
• A business-as-usual setting (M0), with no
policy at all.
The gain — or welfare difference — is calculated
as the drop in environmental damages minus mit-
igation costs. Fig. 3 shows box whisker plots of
the expected welfare gains from adding a given in-
stument mix compared to the BAU setting (M0 to
M3, M0 to M2, M0 to M1) in all scenarios where
uncertainty is such that the CO2 price turns out to
be nil in the low-demand state of the world.
Compared to a BAU setting with no instrument
(mix M0), The gains from having an ETS and a
REP subsidy if there is a risk that the CO2 price
equals zero in the low-demand state are quite im-
portant, ranging from more than e1.4 billion to sev-
eral hundred million e. The gains from adding a
REP subsidy to an ETS range from ca. e10 million
to several hundred million e. They represent from
approximately 3% to 24% of the gains one could
expect from a first-best carbon tax.
4.5. Expected emissions, productions and prices
with various instrument mixes
Following our analysis in section 3 and illustrat-
ing Proposition 3, the Fig. 4 presents box whisker
plots of expected values of different variables in the
simulations with a nil CO2 price in the low-demand
state (superscript n). We computed those values
with a 1st Best instrument mix (a carbon tax, la-
beled M1), with a 2
nd Best setting (ETS + subsidy,
labeled Mn2 ) and in a 3
rd Best setting (ETS alone,
labeled Mn3 ). Figure 4a presents the expected emis-
sions, Figure 4b the expected CO2 price, Figure 4c
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Figure 4: Box whisker plots of the expected values of various variables in simulations M1 (carbon tax), M
n
2
(ETS + REP subsidy) and Mn3 (ETS alone) when the CO2 price is nil in the low-demand state.
the expected energy production and Figure 4d the
expected wholesale price.
Consistently with Proposition 3, Figure 4a shows
that expected emissions are lower in the Mn2 setting
than in the Mn3 setting, and the lowest in the M1
setting. The expected CO2 price is the lowest in
the Mn2 setting. As a result, the wholesale price is
also the smallest in the Mn2 setting, but expected
energy production is the highest.
4.6. Shift in the optimal emission cap and CO2
price
In order to discuss the optimization behavior of
the social planner, we analyze the optimal instru-
ment levels and carbon price in the second-best set-
ting (labeled M2) for all parameter combinations.
For each combination, the uncertainty on the elec-
tricity demand is either low enough to get an op-
timal emission cap that is binding in both states
of demand (Mp2), either too high and implies a nil
CO2 price in the low-demand state of the world
(Mn2 ). We then compare the two groups of simu-
lations and show the results as box whisker plots
in Fig. 5. Fig. 5a shows the optimal emission cap
for all parameter combination, Fig. 5b the REP
subsidy, Fig. 5c the CO2 price in the high-demand
state of the world and Fig. 5d the CO2 price in the
low-demand state of the world.
As already discussed in section 2, Fig. 5a shows a
higher emission cap in all Mn2 scenarios. This is due
to the fact that when the CO2 price turns out to
be nil in the low-demand state, no additional mit-
igation effort is made in this state and the cap is
optimized ex-ante on the high demand level. Fig.
5b, 5c and 5d illustrate Proposition 2. If there is
a risk that the CO2 price equals zero as for all M
n
2
scenarios in Fig. 5d, there is a strictly positive sub-
sidy (Mn2 scenarios in Fig. 5b) and the CO2 price in
the high-demand state of the world drops compared
to Mp2 scenarios(Fig. 5c).
5. Discussion and conclusion
We bring a new contribution to the analysis of the
coexistence of several policy instruments to cover
the same emission sources. We find that optimizing
simultaneously an ETS and e.g. a subsidy to renew-
able energy power (REP) can improve the welfare
compared to a situation with the ETS alone, espe-
cially if uncertainty on the level of electricity de-
mand (and hence on the abatement costs) is high
enough. In a context of a very low CO2 price and
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Figure 5: Box whisker plot of various instrument levels and CO2 price in simulations M
n
2 (ETS + REP
subsidy and a nil CO2 price in the low-demand state) and simulations M
n
2 (ETS + REP subsidy and a
strictly positive CO2 price in the low-demand state).
large anticipated surplus on the EU ETS at least
until 2020, these findings justify the addition of
other policy instruments aiming at reducing CO2
emissions covered by the ETS to a possible future
revision of the emission cap.
We find that under a reasonable set of parame-
ters, defining simultaneously an emission cap and
an overlapping policy instrument, such as a REP
subsidy of about e2.7/MWh to e9.9/MWh (cor-
responding to a tariff ranging from e85/MWh to
e95/MWh) can improve welfare by about 2.4% to
23.6% of the total gain of a carbon tax, that is
about e9 million/yr to e366 million/yr. This gain
is obtained through CO2 emission reductions alone
and does not rely on additional market failures or
externalities. The addition of a REP subsidy also
increases the total energy production, decreases the
electricity price and the CO2 price and reduces the
total expected emissions. Our results are in line
with existing literature concerning the decreasing
effect of a REP subsidy on the carbon price when
it is combined with an emission cap. We how-
ever find that under certain circumstances, inter-
actions between a subsidy and an emission cap can
reduce emissions and improve welfare, compared to
an emission cap alone.
On a more methodological note, our results invite
to deepen the reflection on the role of uncertainty.
Noticeably, they highlight the possibility of corner
solutions (in this case, a zero CO2 price), when com-
paring policy instruments and policy packages. In
addition to showing that an optimal policy mix to
reduce CO2 emissions can contain more than one
instrument, we find several key analytical results
that qualitatively differ from the literature. For in-
stance, expected emissions are no longer equivalent
between policy instruments, even with an additive
uncertainty on the marginal abatement cost, and
the optimal emission cap no longer depends on all
states of nature but only on the high-demand one.
Our results are based on the assumption that the
risk of the CO2 price dropping to zero cannot be
excluded. The history of many cap-and-trade sys-
tems, including the US acid rain program, RGGI
and the EU ETS, fully justifies this assumption,
since the allowance price has dropped to virtually
zero (or to the floor price) in all these systems.
Moreover, uncertainty on the CO2 price does not
only stem from the business cycle, as in our model,
but also from uncertainty on future policies, such as
the Energy Efficiency Directive whose implementa-
tion is currently debated in the EU. Our analysis
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brings some economic insight into the debate about
the future European policy mix and about whether
it is justified or preferable to complement a future
revision of the EU-ETS cap with an overlapping
instrument.
While developping renewables is a valuable op-
tion to mitigate emissions, our results could be ob-
tained with any instrument giving an incentive to
reduce emissions in states of the world with low
demand levels. Instruments promoting energy effi-
ciency could be equally efficient, provided the ac-
tual energy consumption reduction is calculated
against the right baseline. One could imagine in-
struments being more efficient in low-demand states
than in high-demand states where mitigation is al-
ready incentivized by the positive carbon price,
such as efficiency standards based on the mitiga-
tion effort. It is hard however to imagine how such
instruments would work in practice. Moreover, we
explore only one channel of potential interactions,
namely uncertainty combined to the unavailability
of a carbon tax. Other justifications and effects
should be considered when trying to give an ac-
curate picture of the potential efficiency of an in-
strument addition to the ETS, such as learning or
innovation considerations and dynamic or general
equlibrium effects for example.
Complementing an ETS with price-like features,
such as an auction reserve price or a price floor as
argued by Fankhauser et al. (2010) would bring the
necessary incentives in the low-demand state. Our
results depend however on the second-best frame-
work implied by an inefficient ETS. Optimizing an
auction price or a floor price along with the emis-
sion ceiling, as in our model, would effectively allow
to get back to a first-best framework by imposing a
floor at the Pigovian level. If on the contrary one
assumes the CO2 price, the floor price or the auc-
tion reserve price to be “too low” (i.e. below the
Pigovian level), as does Hoel (2012), our framework
becomes relevant again and an additional instru-
ment becomes welfare-improving.
Further aspects could be worth investigating.
Modeling banking across trading periods with pe-
riodic renegotiation of the cap could mitigate the
sub-optimality of the ETS hence the room for com-
plementary policies, but it would seriously com-
plicate the analysis without necessarily providing
new insights. Assuming other sources of uncer-
tainty, such as technological or regulatory uncer-
tainty could also have an effect on the outcome,
depending on the probability associated with a nil
carbon price. Finally, we focus our analysis on
one channel of positive interactions between several
mitigation instruments. Completing the picture by
incorporating other market failures could bring use-
ful insights on the benefits brought by adding a mit-
igation instrument to the ETS.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3
We compute expected emissions in three instru-
ment mix settings (see Appendix C for a descrip-
tion of all instrument settings used and a reference
to the expression of the complete solution):
• A first-best instrument mix, with a unique
CO2 price across all states of the world
9;
• A second-best instrument mix, with an
ETS and a REP subsidy;
• A third-best instrument mix, with an ETS
alone.
The uncertainty is assumed to be such as the CO2
price resulting from an ETS in the low-demand
state turns out to be nil (as shown in the model
description above). The expected emissions Ee are
given by:
Ee =
∑
s∈states
Ps · (τ · fs − as) (A.1)
Let us call Ee,X the expected emissions for a given
instrument mix X ∈ [1, 2, 3], the index referring
respectively to the first-best, second-best and third-
9Since the marginal damage is flat, the first-best instru-
ment is always a price instrument, e.g. a carbon tax.
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best mix as described above:
Ee,1 =ιdτ −∆(1− 2λ)τ + ιrσrτ (A.2)
− ιf (σd + σr)τ − δ(1/(σa)
+ (σd + σr)(τ)
2)
Ee,2 =ιdτ −∆(1− 2λ)τ + ιrσrτ (A.3)
− ιf (σd + σr)τ
− (δσa(σd + σr)(λ(σd − σr) + σr)(τ)
4)
(1 + σa(σd + σr − λσr)(τ)2)
− (δ(λ+ σa(2λσd + σr)(τ)
2))
(σa + (σa)2(σd + σr − λσr)(τ)2)
Ee,3 =ιdτ −∆(1− 2λ)τ + ιrσrτ (A.4)
− ιf (σd + σr)τ
− δλ(1/(σa) + (σd + σr)(τ)2)
where we see that Ee,1 < Ee,2 and that Ee,2 < Ee,3.
This result can be linked to the differences i nthe
expected carbon price.
C =
∑
s∈states
Ps · φs (A.5)
The expected carbon price for a given instrument
mix X ∈ [1, 2, 3] is:
C1 = δ (A.6)
C2 = δ · λ(1 + σaσd(τ)
2)
1 + σa(σd + σr − λσr)τ2 (A.7)
C3 = λδ (A.8)
with C2 < C1 and that C2 < C3.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4
We solve the model by assuming only{
τ · f+ − a+ = Ω
φ+ > 0
and make no assumption on the level of emissions
in the low-demand state. By using the method de-
veloped in Appendix E, we compute the difference
of the emissions minus the cap:
(τ · f− − a−)− Ω =
− ( (2∆σa(σd + (−1 + λ)σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr − λσr)(τ)2))
+
(δσaσd(σd + σr)(τ)
4)
(1 + σa(σd + σr − λσr)(τ)2)
+
(δ − 2∆σaτ + δσa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
(σa + (σa)2(σd + σr − λσr)(τ)2)
We then compute the partial derivative of this ex-
pression with respect to all parameters, and test
their positivity.
Appendix C. Description of the model
types and instrument settings
used in the analytical and nu-
merical results
Table C.7 links the names used in the text and
the instrument settings used in each case. The de-
tailed description of the model framework and the
optimal solution calculated using Mathematica are
given in the subsequent Appendices. Calculation
sheets are available upon request to the authors.
The model used for the analytical results differ
slightly from the model used for the numerical re-
sults. The numerical model allows for allowance
trading by adding an emitting sector from which
the electricity producer can buy surplus allowances.
The instruments settings and names attached are
the same for both models.
Appendix D to Appendix H show the framework
and optimal solution for the model used in the an-
alytcal part. Appendix I show the framework and
optimal solution for the model used in the numeri-
cal part, with the Mn2 setting. Showing the details
of all settings for the model used in the numerical
part would be very long and are not shown here.
They are available upon request to the authors.
Appendix D. First Best setting: model
with carbon tax
To simulate an economy-wide carbon tax, we add
following constraint to the model framework from
Section 3:
φ− = φ+
The socially optimal level of all market variables
for the high-demand state (subscript +) and low
demand (subscript –) are:
Ω? = −( δ
σa
) + ∆τ + ιdτ − ιfσdτ − ιfσrτ
+ ιrσrτ − δσd(τ)2 − δσr(τ)2
ρ? = 0
f?− = −∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)
− δ(σd + σr)τ
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Label Nature Instrument setting p−CO2 Described in
Carbon tax ETS REP Subsidy
M1 1
st Best Yes Useless Useless Positive Appendix D
Mn2 2
nd Best Unavailable Yes Yes Nil Appendix E
Mp2 2
nd Best Unavailable Yes Yes Positive Appendix F
Mn3 3
rd Best Unavailable Yes Unavailable Nil Appendix G
Mp3 3
rd Best Unavailable Yes Unavailable Positive Appendix H
Table C.7: Description of the model types and instrument settings
r?− = σr(ιf − ιr + δτ)
p?− = ιf + δτ
a?− =
δ
σa
φ?− = δ
f?+ = ∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)
− δ(σd + σr)τ
r?+ = σr(ιf − ιr + δτ)
p?+ = ιf + δτ
a?+ =
δ
σa
φ?+ = δ
Appendix E. Second Best setting: model
with ETS, REP subsidy and
a nil CO2 price in the low-
demand state
Solving the profit maximization problem of the
producer gives the reaction functions of producers,
depending on the level of policy instruments and
the state of the world (the first-order conditions are
given in (4-6)). Solving the welfare maximization
problem of the social planner knowing all the reac-
tion functions gives the following first-order condi-
tions:
(
∂EW
∂ρ
= 0,
∂EW
∂Ω
= 0
)
⇒
0 =
(ρ?σaσr(σd + σr − λσr)(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δ(−1 + λ)σaσr(σd + σr)(τ)3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(ρ
? + δ(−1 + λ)τ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
(E.1)
0 =
(ιfλσa(σd + σr)τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(λ(δ − (∆ + ιd)σaτ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(λσaτ(−ιrσr + δσdτ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(λσa(Ω
? + δσr(τ)
2))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
(E.2)
from which we directly derive the optimal level
of the policy instruments. By substituting the op-
timal levels of policy instruments in the reaction
functions, we obtain the socially optimal level of all
market variables for the high-demand state (sub-
script +) and low demand (subscript –).
The optimal solution is:
Ω? = −( δ
σa
) + ∆τ + ιdτ − ιfσdτ − ιfσrτ
+ ιrσrτ − δσd(τ)2 − δσr(τ)2
ρ? = −( (δσa(−σr + λ(σd + σr))(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + λσr)(τ)2)
)
− (δτ(−(1/2)− σaσd(τ)
2))
(1 + σa(σd + λσr)(τ)2)
f?− = −∆ + ιd −
(2(−ιrσr + ιf (σd + σr)))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((ιf − ιr)σa(σr)2(τ)2)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
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+
(2σaσd(ιfσd − ιrσr)(τ)2)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σrτ(δ + 3ιfσaσdτ))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?− =
(2(ιf − ιr)σaσdσr(τ)2)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((ιf − ιr)σa(σr)2(τ)2)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(2ιf − 2ιr + δτ))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?− = ιf
a?− = 0
φ?− = 0
f?+ = ∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
− (δσrτ)
(2(1 + σa(σd + λσr)(τ)2))
r?+ =
(2(ιf − ιr)σaσdσr(τ)2)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((ιf − ιr)σa(σr)2(τ)2)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσr(3σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(2ιf − 2ιr + 3δτ))
(2 + σa(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?+ =
(σa(τ)
2(ιfλσr + δσdτ))
(1 + σa(σd + λσr)(τ)2)
+
(ιf + δτ + ιfσaσd(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + λσr)(τ)2)
a?+ =
(δ + δσaσd(τ)
2)
(σa + (σa)2(σd + λσr)(τ)2)
φ?+ =
(δ + δσaσd(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + λσr)(τ)2)
Appendix F. Second Best setting: model
with ETS, REP subsidy and
a strictly positive CO2 price
in the low-demand state
We assumed through this paper that the carbon
price is nil in the low-demand state of the world.
This is the case for certain parameter combinations,
as discussed in section 3.4. For some other combi-
nations, the carbon price remains positive in both
states, and the model is changed as follows. Equa-
tion (3) becomes:
{
τ · f− − a− = Ω
φ− > 0
or
{
τ · f+ − a+ = Ω
φ+ > 0
The optimal solution changes also and becomes:
Ω? = −( δ
σa
) + ιdτ − ιfσdτ
− ιfσrτ + ιrσrτ − δσd(τ)2 − δσr(τ)2
ρ? = 0
f?− = ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
− (∆)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?− = −(
(∆σaσr(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2))
+
((ιf − ιr)σaσdσr(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((ιf − ιr)σa(σr)2(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(ιf − ιr + δτ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?− =
(σa(−∆ + ιf (σd + σr))(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσa(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(ιf + δτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
a?− =
δ
σa
− (∆τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
φ?− = δ −
(∆σaτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
f?+ = ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
+
(∆)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?+ = −(
(ιrσaσdσr(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2))
+
(σa(∆ + ιfσd)σr(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
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+
((ιf − ιr)σa(σr)2(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(ιf − ιr + δτ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?+ =
(σa(∆ + ιfσd)(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(ιf + δτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σa(τ)
2(ιfσr + δ(σd + σr)τ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
a?+ =
δ
σa
+
(∆τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
φ?+ = δ +
(∆σaτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
Appendix G. Third Best setting: model
with ETS only and a nil CO2
price in the low-demand state
To simulate a third-best setting with no REP
subsidy, we add following constraint to the model
framework from Section 3:
ρ = 0
The socially optimal level of all market variables
for the high-demand state (subscript +) and low
demand (subscript –) are:
Ω? = −( δ
σa
) + ∆τ + ιdτ − ιfσdτ − ιfσrτ
+ ιrσrτ − δσd(τ)2 − δσr(τ)2
ρ? = 0
f?− = −∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)
r?− = (ιf − ιr)σr
p?− = ιf
a?− = 0
φ?− = 0
f?+ = ∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
r?+ = σr(ιf − ιr + δτ)
p?+ = ιf + δτ
a?+ =
δ
σa
φ?+ = δ
Appendix H. Third Best setting: model
with ETS only and a positive
CO2 price in the low-demand
state
To simulate a third-best setting with no REP
subsidy, we add following constraint to the model
framework from Appendix F:
ρ = 0
The socially optimal level of all market variables
for the high-demand state (subscript +) and low
demand (subscript –) are:
Ω? = −( δ
σa
) + ιdτ − ιfσdτ − ιfσrτ
+ ιrσrτ − δσd(τ)2 − δσr(τ)2
ρ? = 0
f?− = ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
− (∆)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?− =
(σa(−∆ + (ιf − ιr)σd)σr(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((ιf − ιr)σa(σr)2(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(ιf − ιr + δτ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?− =
(σa(−∆ + ιf (σd + σr))(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσa(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(ιf + δτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
a?− =
δ
σa
− (∆τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
φ?− = δ −
(∆σaτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
f?+ = ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
+
(∆)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?+ =
(∆σaσr(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((ιf − ιr)σaσr(σd + σr)(τ)2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
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+
(δσaσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(σr(ιf − ιr + δτ))
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?+ =
(∆σa(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(ιfσa(σd + σr)(τ)
2)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσa(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(ιf + δτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
a?+ =
δ
σa
+
(∆τ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
φ?+ = δ +
(∆σaτ)
(1 + σa(σd + σr)(τ)2)
Appendix I. Model with allowances from
non-electricity ETS sectors
and nil CO2 price in the low-
demand state
Section 4 extends the model and allows for al-
lowance trading by adding an emitting sector from
which the electricity producer can buy surplus al-
lowances. This surplus is labeled e and its supply
is modeled by a linear mac curve. The profit max-
imization problem becomes:
max
f,r,a,e
Π(p, f, r, a, e, φ) = p · f + (p+ ρ) · r
− Cf (f)− Cr(r)−AC(a)
−ACe(e)− PCe(f, a, e, φ)
with
ACe(e) =
σe
2
e2 −
{
ιe · e low demand
0 high demand
The allowance purchasing cost is modified as fol-
lows:
PCe(f, a, e, φ) = φ · (τ · f − a+ e)
and (3) becomes:{
τ · f?− − a?− < Ω− e?−
φ?− = 0
or
{
τ · f?+ − a?+ = Ω− e?+
φ?+ > 0
The welfare maximization problem becomes:
max
Ω,ρ
EW (Ω, ρ) =
∑
states
1
2
[CS(p)
+ Π(p, f, r, a, e, φ)− dame(f, a, e)
− ρ · r + PCe(f, a, e, φ)]
where dame(·) is the modified environmental dam-
age function:
dame(f, a, e) = δ · (τf − a− e)
The optimal solution of this problem is the fol-
lowing:
Ω? = −( (δ(σa + σe))
(σaσe)
)
+ (∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr))τ
− δ(σd + σr)(τ)2
ρ? =
(δτ(σa + σe + σaσe(σd + σr)(τ)
2))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
f?− = −∆ + ιd − ιfσd − ιfσr
+ ιrσr − (δσr(σd + σr)τ)
(2σd + σr)
+
(δ(σa + σe)(σr)
2τ)
(2σd + σr)(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?− =
((ιf − ιr)σaσeσr(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
(δσaσeσr(σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+
((σa + σe)σr(2ιf − 2ιr + δτ))
(2σe + σa(2 + 2σdσe(τ)2 + σeσr(τ)2))
p?− = ιf
a?− = 0
e?− =
(ιe)
(σe)
φ?− = 0
f?+ = ∆ + ιd + ιrσr − ιf (σd + σr)− δ(σd + σr)τ
− (δ(σa + σe)σrτ)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
r?+ =
(δσaσeσr(3σd + σr)(τ)
3)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
+ σr(ιf − ιr)
+ σr
(3δ(σa + σe)τ)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
p?+ = ιf +
(2δ(σa + σe)τ)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
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+
(2δσaσdσe(τ)
3)
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
a?+ =
(2δ(σa + σe + σaσdσe(τ)
2))
(σa(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2))
e?+ =
(2δ(σa + σe + σaσdσe(τ)
2))
(σe(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2))
φ?+ =
(2δ(σa + σe + σaσdσe(τ)
2))
(2(σa + σe) + σaσe(2σd + σr)(τ)2)
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